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ABSTRACT 
 
Ecofeminists have long exposed the gendered character of human 
progress and its destructive impact on social and environmental commons. 
They contend that mainstream strategies responding to environmental 
crises reaffirm the subordination of women and non-human nature, while 
also reinforcing the power structures that sustain a white, heteronormative 
and masculine hegemony. While there is significant ecofeminist 
scholarship in gender and environment studies, there is little research to 
date which deconstructs international environmental law in order to explore 
the extent to which it maintains, reinforces or transforms understandings 
about human/non-human connections and their gendered nature. This 
article contributes to broader ecofeminist scholarship by synthesising 
Karen Warren’s ecofeminist ethics into an analytical framework through 
which to analyse international environmental law. The article develops an 
original analysis of how transformational international legal regimes have 
been in shaping the international community’s view of the environment and 
human/non-human interconnections. Comparing the often-ignored UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 1994, as well as the more 
(in)famous UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
1992, the author evaluates to what extent these regimes engage with and 
respond to the underlying institutional, structural, social, and conceptual 
frameworks that contribute to the continued degradation of the 
environment. The author concludes that while these regimes have 
transformative potential, they both continue to affirm an ideological 
perspective that disembeds humanity from the environment, while at the 
same time commodifying nature in order to protect it. 
Keywords: UNFCCC, UNCCD, climate change, desertification, 
ecofeminism, ecofeminist ethics, international law,  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Desertification and climate change are intimately interrelated 
phenomena. With global temperatures rising because of climate change, 
there are higher incidences of drought, desertification and heatwaves.1 The 
combination of climate change and desertification has a disproportionate 
effect on communities already vulnerable and disadvantaged because of 
broader economic, social, cultural and political factors. For example, at the 
time of writing, communities in Mali, Malawi and Kenya are facing 
starvation due to drought and changes in rainfall.2 These examples show 
the very real impact of climate change, drought and desertification on the 
lives of people living in vulnerable communities. 
Over the last thirty years, the international community has mobilised 
international legal and policy responses to desertification and climate 
change. The international community first discussed desertification in 1977 
at the United Conference on Desertification, where it adopted the Plan of 
Action to Combat Desertification.3 Since then, concerns over the impact of 
desertification and drought have been raised in various fora, including the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.4 After 
significant campaigning by developing countries, states adopted the 1994 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa 
(UNCCD). This Convention outlines the obligations for states to undertake 
with respect to desertification and drought.  
                                                     
1  Qi Feng and others, ‘What Has Caused Desertification in China?’ (2015) 5 
Scientific Reports 15998. 
2 ICRC, ‘Community-Level Economic Support Provides a Lifeline for Women in 
Northern Mali’ (2018) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/mali-economic-
securitycommunity-support-lifeline-women> accessed 28 February 2018; Charles 
Mkoka, ‘Drought-Hit Malawi Farmers Use Sugar and Fish Soup to Battle Pests’, 
Reuters (26 February 2018); Agatha Ngotho, ‘Herders Get Sh175m to Ease Effects 
of Drought’, The Star (Kenya, 28 February 2018) <https://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2018/02/28/herders-get-sh175m-to-ease-effects-of-
drought_c1721731> accessed 28 February 2018. 
3  United Nations, ‘Plan of Action to Combat Desertification’ (United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 1977) UN Doc A/CONF.74/36, 
(1977). 
4  Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development 1992 (UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development) (14 June 1992) UN Doc 
A/Conf151/126/Rev1 vol I Chapter 12. 
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Compared to the issue of desertification, climate change is a relative 
newcomer, being first characterised as a “common concern” for humankind 
by the UN General Assembly in 1988, and again in 1989.5 The General 
Assembly established an intergovernmental negotiating process under its 
auspices to negotiate a Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
1990.6 Two years later, after tense negotiations, states adopted the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
As will be shown below, these regimes have very different origins, histories 
and positions on the international stage. However, both offer transformative 
potential to engage with the underlying institutional, structural, social, and 
conceptual frameworks that contribute to the continued degradation of the 
environment. 
This article compares the “transformative potential” of the UNFCCC 
and UNCCD regimes. For the purposes of this article, “transformative” 
refers to how far these regimes engage with the underlying institutional, 
structural, social, and conceptual frameworks that contribute to the 
continued degradation of the environment. Where these regimes engage 
with and seek to alter these frameworks, they demonstrate transformative 
potential – even if such transformation has not  
In order to explore the transformative potential of these two regimes, 
this article analyses and compares their legal texts through an ecofeminist 
analytical framework based on the boundary conditions of Karen Warren’s 
ecofeminist ethics. 7  Her ethics are particularly suited to exploring the 
transformative potentials of the UNFCCC and UNCCD regimes because 
they enable a nuanced analysis of the values, assumptions and beliefs 
informing the development of these two regimes. Because this ethical 
framework re-envisions political strategies, ethical frameworks and 
scientific understandings, it enables a comparison between the current 
positions, strategies and frameworks incorporated in these regimes against 
an explicitly transformative ethic. 
As will be explained in section two of this article, the analytical 
framework developed in this article draws on three of Warren’s boundary 
                                                     
5  United Nations General Assembly Res 42/53 ‘Protection of the Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind’ (6 December 1988) UN Doc 
A/RES/52/53 preamble; United Nations General Assembly Res 44/207 ‘Protection 
of the Global Environment for Present and Future Generations’ (22 December 
1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/207 preamble. 
6 United Nations General Assembly Res 45/212 ‘Protection of the Climate for 
Present and Future Generations’ (21 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/212. 
7 See Karen J Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It 
Is and Why It Matters (Rowman & Littlefield 2000). 
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conditions to form interconnecting lenses through which the legal texts of 
the environmental regimes are read. 8  The first and second lenses are 
labelled “inclusivity” and “contextuality”. They have relevance when 
comparing the extent to which the participatory provisions of the climate 
change and desertification regimes are transformative in scope. They are 
also relevant when comparing the types of knowledge that are valued within 
each regime. The third and final lens is called “structural pluralism”. This 
lens illuminates how sameness and difference are approached within the 
two regimes. Because of the transformative nature of Warren’s ecofeminist 
ethics, they enable a nuanced comparison the UNFCCC and UNCCD 
regimes.  
This article begins by introducing the UNFCCC, UNCCD, and the 
concept of sustainable development which informs both agreements. 
Section two outlines the key points of ecofeminist theory and sets out the 
analytical framework developed from Warren’s ecofeminist ethics. Section 
three analyses the two agreements and their policy documents to compare 
and contrast the transformative potential embedded in their texts. Using the 
three lenses – inclusivity, contextuality and structural pluralism – it 
compares the ways in which they treat the voices of marginalised 
communities and ecosystem services, their approaches to integrating 
science and technology into the environmental regimes, and the 
operationalism of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities as a way to attend to and recognise differences in capacities 
between states. Section four summarises the analysis and reflects on the 
extent to which these regimes fulfil their transformative potential.  
 
 
1.1 Introducing sustainable development, the UNCCD and UNFCCC 
 
The UNCCD and UNFCCC focus on the issues of desertification and 
climate change respectively. Both refer to the importance of attaining 
sustainable development. While not a new concept, 9  sustainable 
                                                     
8 This article builds on previous research developed in Kate Wilkinson Cross, ‘The 
Environment as Commodity? An Ecofeminist Analysis of the Extent to Which 
Associations between Security and the Environment Have Altered the Perception 
of the Environment in International Law’ (PhD thesis, University of Sheffield 
2016); Kate Wilkinson Cross, ‘Ecofeminist Potentials for International 
Environmental Law’ in Douglas A Vakoch and Sam Mickey (eds), Ecofeminism 
in Dialogue (Lexington Books 2017). 
9  See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable 
Development Law: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Oxford University Press 
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development has emerged over the last forty years or so as “an important 
concept in global efforts to balance economic, social and environmental 
policies and laws.”10 Because of its importance to the evolution of the two 
regimes, this article will first introduce sustainable development, its key 
principles and why the international community have latched onto it as an 
agenda to achieve poverty eradication, economic growth and 
environmental preservation.11 
 
1.1.1 Sustainable development in international law and policy 
 
The most accepted definition of sustainable development is 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.12 Thus, there are 
two key elements to this concept. First, the substantive recognition that 
development should meet human needs by seeking to end poverty. Second, 
the concept recognises that there are limits to development: it must be 
“bounded by the evolving constraints of human abilities (technology, 
governance), and also by diverse environmental limitations.”13 Therefore, 
sustainable development can be understood as a “bridge” which recognises 
that the obligation towards future generations requires a balance between 
economic and social development pressures and environmental limits.  
Sustainable development is constructed to “frame cooperative, 
integrative solutions to some of the most significant challenges of our era” 
that change over time. 14  Therefore, it can be understood as an 
“integrationist principle” whose “components seek to balance the 
competing economic, social and environmental interests of the 
                                                     
2004) 15–23; Philippe Sands and others, Principles of International Environmental 
Law (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2018) 217–21. 
10 Cordonier Segger and Khalfan (n 9) 15. 
11 United Nations General Assembly Res 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1 
para 5. 
12  WCED, Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and 
Development; Oxford University Press 1987) 8. 
13 Cordonier Segger and Khalfan (n 9) 3. 
14 Ibid. 
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international community”. 15  It is explicitly human-centred16  and this is 
reflected in both the substantive and procedural elements of the concept. 
Some of the key procedural elements of sustainable development 
require states, non-state actors and other participants to empower, consult, 
support public participation, undertake impact and risk assessments, and 
expand capacity-building and other undefined opportunities. These 
principles have been included in international law and policy relating to the 
environment.17 The breadth and depth of law and policy indicates that the 
procedural elements of sustainable development have been widely accepted 
by the international community.18 The substantive elements of sustainable 
development place limitations on the exploitation of the natural 
environment and are articulated in principles such as inter-generational 
equity, differential treatment and the precautionary approach. 19  These 
principles have also been included in international law and governance.20 
However, compared to the procedural elements of sustainable 
development, their legal content remains underdeveloped.21 
                                                     
15 Wilkinson Cross, ‘The Environment as Commodity?’ (n 8) 44.  
16 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 (UN Conference on 
Environment and Development) (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF151/26 (vol I); 
31 ILM 874 (1992) principle 1. 
17 Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries 1989 (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) 28 
ILM 1382 (1989); Rio Declaration 1992; Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 
12 October 2014) UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (29 October 2010); Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) Judgement, 2010 ICJ Reports 14; 
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v 
Nicaragua) Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, 2011 ICJ Reports 6; 
The South China Sea Arbitration (the Republic of the Philippines v the People’s 
Republic of China) Award, (12 July 2016) PCA Case No 2013-19.  
18 See in general, Sands and others (n 10) 197–250; Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge 
E Viñuales, International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press 2018) 
58–99.  
19  Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2003) 253.  
20  Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 1972 (United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment) (16 June 1972) UN Doc 
A/CONF48/14/REV1 (1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972) (1972); Rio Declaration 1992; 
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD) (adopted 5 June 1992, entered 
into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
21 For general discussion, see Dupuy and Viñuales (n 18); Sands and others (n 10). 
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Sustainable development is an inherently flexible concept because it is 
both a process and a goal. It is a process that remains central to ongoing 
negotiations in environmental regimes and in the wider international 
community. It continues to evolve and remains central to collective and 
cooperative responses of the international community to the interrelated 
issues of sustainability and development. 
 
1.1.2 The UNCCD and its annexes  
 
As stated above, there have been long-term concerns over 
desertification. The 1977 Plan of Action to Combat Desertification was one 
of the first attempts to address the issue at the international level. However, 
by 1991, the UN Environment Programme concluded that international 
efforts had not been successful, and desertification had intensified.22 In 
light of these concerns, developing countries raised the issue of adopting a 
convention to combat desertification during the preparations for the 1992 
Rio Conference on Environment and Development. 23  Faced with 
significant opposition by countries within the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the finalised text of Agenda 21, 
which set out the international action plan to achieve sustainable 
development, included a paragraph outlining that an inter-governmental 
negotiating committee should be established for the elaboration of a 
convention to combat desertification.24 After difficult negotiations, states 
adopted the UNCCD in 1994 which entered into force in 1996. 
The Convention is explicitly embedded in the paradigm of sustainable 
development. It adopts a bottom-up, holistic approach to preventing 
desertification at the local, national, and regional levels. It bases many of 
its objectives on attaining sustainable development, while also establishing 
differing obligations for developed country parties and affected developing 
country parties.25 By doing so, the Convention takes into account the social 
and economic development needs of developing countries while also 
addressing the serious environmental problem of desertification.  
                                                     
22 UNEP, ‘Status of Desertification and Implementation of the United Nations Plan 
of Action to Combat Desertification: Report of the Executive Director’ (United 
Nations Environment Programme 1991) UN Doc UNEP/GC/SS.III/3.  
23  Bo Kjellen, ‘The Saga of the Convention to Combat Desertification: The 
Rio/Johannesburg Process and the Global Responsibility for the Drylands’ (2003) 
12 RECIEL 127, 128.  
24 Agenda 21 1992 chapter 12.40. 
25 Pamela S Chasek, ‘The Convention to Combat Desertification: Lessons Learned 
for Sustainable Development’ (1997) 6 JED 147, 148.  
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This integrative approach is embedded in the objectives of the UNCCD 
and in the ways in which parties should implement their obligations. Article 
2 states that the objective of the UNCCD is to “combat desertification and 
mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought 
and/or desertification, particularly in Africa”. 26  Parties achieve this 
objective by ensuring effective action at all levels, within a framework of 
an “integrated approach”, with a view to contributing towards achieving 
sustainable development in affected areas. Therefore, the UNCCD 
encourages parties to focus on improving the productivity of land, 
rehabilitating, conserving and sustainably managing land and water 
resources, which will lead to improved living conditions at the community 
level.27  
 
1.1.3 The UNFCCC regime 
 
The UNFCCC is a package of compromises.28 It contains elements for 
almost all the negotiating states, but no state was satisfied by the adopted 
convention. 29  Therefore, at the time, many commentators viewed the 
UNFCCC as “punctuation mark in an ongoing process of negotiations.”30 
The objective of the Convention is to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions at 
a level that prevents dangerous “anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”.31 It includes general principles to guide the parties’ efforts 
in achieving stabilisation of the climate, including the precautionary 
approach, inter-generational equity, common but differentiated 
responsibilities, and sustainable development, among others.32 
                                                     
26  United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa 
(adopted 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 art 
2(1).  
27 Ibid art 2.  
28 Sands and others (n 9) 299. 
29 For a detailed history on the FCCC negotiations and entry into force, see Daniel 
Bodansky and others, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 
2017) 102–05. 
30 Ibid 105. 
31 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (adopted 9 
May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 art 2.  
32 Ibid art 3.  
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The climate change regime has subsequently evolved through the 
adoption of two other legally binding agreements,33 as well as subsequent 
Conference of the Parties (COP) decisions. Recognising that the 
commitments included in the UNFCCC were unlikely to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This 
Protocol contains additional commitments for developed countries to limit 
their anthropogenic emissions through targets.34 Like the UNFCCC, the 
Protocol and subsequent COP decisions reflect a consolidation of a “top-
down” regime in which states set internationally-defined, legally-binding 
emission reduction targets, in line with the guiding principles of the 
UNFCCC.35 This top-down approach has been subject to criticisms in terms 
of both of effectiveness and in terms of the differentiation between 
developed and developing countries within the regime.36  
In 2015, the international community adopted the Paris Agreement, 
which came into force in 2016. Unlike the previous two agreements, the 
Agreement addresses the long-term commitments by all parties, rather than 
maintaining the traditional firewall between developed and developing 
countries. Rather than including an annex of targets and timetables, the 
Paris Agreement introduces the concept of “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDCs) as a bottom-up approach towards mitigating climate 
change.37 This bottom-up approach means that parties to the Agreement 
submit their own contributions towards addressing climate change, based 
on their individual national circumstances. Thus, there are no top-down, 
internationally agreed targets and timetables and instead, the aim is to 
ensure that each party achieves their commitments and does not fall back 
                                                     
33 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change 1997 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 
162; Paris Agreement 2015 (signed 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 
November 2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add1. 
34 Kyoto Protocol art 3.  
35 William Hare and others, ‘The Architecture of the Global Climate Regime: A 
Top-Down Perspective’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 600, 601–02; Daniel Bodansky, 
‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future UN Climate Change Regime’ 
(Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, 7 March 2011) 
2. 
36 Steve Rayner, ‘How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate 
Policy’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 615.  
37 Paris Agreement art 3.  
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on them.38 As yet, how this will work is still to be negotiated through the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (known as the CMA).39  
This short overview highlights that both regimes have faced 
controversy during their initial creation and in their subsequent evolution. 
They share some similarities in terms of the content and references to 
broader economic and development factors. They both include references 
to the paradigm of sustainable development. Both recognise that external 
issues, such as international trade, economic development, social 
development, levels of technical capacity and other factors, affect the extent 
to which different communities will be able to achieve the objectives and 
obligations under each agreement. They each have transformative potential 
fundamentally to address the environmental problems faced by 
communities around the globe.  
However, unlike the UNCCD, the climate change regime is never out 
of the spotlight. The issues of differentiation, the tension between 
developed and developing countries, the gendered aspect of climate 
change, and the relationship between climate change mitigation, 
adaptation, and sustainable development all mean that the regime remains 
in focus. The UNCCD on the other hand, has produced an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of its communication due to concerns that it was reaching a 
limited audience and that its message was getting lost.40 This demonstrates 
institutional concern that environmental problems such as desertification 
and drought are being subsumed by the continued focus on climate change. 
Not only does this limit the pressure exerted by civil society on their states 
to fulfil their obligations under the UNCCD, but it also means that the 
UNCCD has less academic and scholarly interest invested in it. Therefore, 
any transformative potential that it has may be underexplored and 
insufficiently highlighted. This article addresses this relative lack of interest 
by comparing and exploring the transformative potentials of these two 
regimes through an ecofeminist analytical framework, introduced below.  
                                                     
38 Ibid art 4; Decision 1/CP21 ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ (12 December 
2015) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add1 paras 205, 23-25.  
39  FCCC, ‘Progress Tracker: Work Programme Resulting from the Relevant 
Requests Contained in Decision 1/CP.21’ (UNFCCC, 2018) 
<http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200
617.pdf> accessed 2 February 2018 (as of 19/01/2018). 
40  UNCCD, ‘Independent Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the UNCCD 
Communication’ (UNCCD, 2015) 6–7  
<https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/relevant-links/2017-
01/Communication%20evaluation%20report%20formatted%20final.pdf> 
accessed 5 February 2018.  
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2 ECOFEMINISM AND ITS RELEVANCE TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
Unlike other approaches to the study of the environment, ecofeminism 
make the connection between the exploitation of the environment and the 
subordination of women central in its analysis. 41  In the mainstream, 
ecofeminism is usually presented as essentialist and uncritical, claiming 
that women are closer to nature than men.42 This does a disservice to the 
scholarship which incorporated materialist and posthumanist analysis of 
gender and the environment prior to these being popular within mainstream 
Western academia.43  It developed highly critical accounts of rationalist 
science, capitalism, speciesism, colonialism, racism, and sexism (hetero 
and queer), which are central to ecological feminist scholarship.44 These 
accounts incorporate Marxist, socialist, socioeconomic, historical, 
epistemological, and political perspectives.45 Therefore, ecofeminism has 
evolved into a philosophy, social activism and an intellectual commitment 
which questions the theoretical and ideological basis of the male-
domination of women and non-human nature.  
                                                     
41 Greta Claire Gaard, ‘Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature’ in Greta 
Claire Gaard (ed), Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature (Temple University 
Press 1993) 1.  
42 See e.g. Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (3rd edn, Routledge 2000); 
John S Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (3rd edn, OUP 
Oxford 2013).  
43 Sherilyn MacGregor, ‘Gender and Environment: An Introduction’ in Sherilyn 
MacGregor (ed), Routledge Handbook of Gender and Environment (Taylor & 
Francis 2017) 1. 
44 For a broad overview of ecofeminist theory and its evolution, see e.g. Charis 
Thompson and Sherilyn MacGregor, ‘The Death of Nature: Foundations of 
Ecological Feminist Thought’ in Sherilyn MacGregor (ed), Routledge Handbook 
of Gender and Environment (Taylor & Francis 2017); Noël Sturgeon, Ecofeminist 
Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory, and Political Action (Routledge 1997); 
Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Opening Out: Feminism for 
Today, Routledge 1993) 1–40; Mary Mellor, Feminism & Ecology (Polity Press 
1997); see also, AE Kings, ‘Intersectionality and the Changing Face of 
Ecofeminism’ (2017) 22 Ethics & the Environment 63; Catriona Mortimer-
Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire 
(Indiana University Press 2010). 
45 Karen J Warren, ‘Feminist Environmental Philosophy’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015, Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Stanford University 2015). 
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This breadth and depth of analysis directly challenges the mainstream 
typology of ecofeminism as limited, simplistic and essentialist. For 
example, John Dryzek’s key text on environmental discourses frames 
ecofeminism as “cultural” and “spiritual”. 46  Andrew Dobson similarly 
introduces ecofeminist scholarship as primarily interested in explaining the 
cultural and social potential of privileging “female” characteristics such as 
empathy and care in his book on green political thought.47 Both authors pay 
limited attention to more recent scholarship, which draws on feminist 
science studies, feminist political economy, feminist political ecology, as 
well as feminist normative theory that “promotes and enacts ethical 
commitments to inclusivity, intersectionality, and democracy”48 while also 
demanding an end to the exploitation of non-human nature and the “the 
dismantling of power structures that sustain, white, masculine, 
heteronormative hegemony within human societies.” 49  Therefore, these 
books provide an unrepresentative account of ecofeminist academic work 
by focusing on the essentialist works of early ecofeminist literature even 
though this work reflects an evolutionary dead-end in the development of 
ecofeminist theory. 
As introduced above, ecofeminists critique the exploitative and 
gendered conceptual frameworks that underpin the dominant and rational 
discourses in western society. These are formed by a set of values, attitudes, 
beliefs, and assumptions that shape and mirror how an entity views itself 
and the world around it, and a number of different factors such as class, 
religion, nationality, gender, and race/ethnicity can alter the mirror in which 
an entity views itself.50 As such, ecofeminism provides a “spotlight” on 
some of the “shared conceptual roots of the unjustified dominations of 
women, non-human animals, and nature”.51  
This critique is used by many ecofeminists to explore the 
interconnecting ways in which these shared conceptual roots function in 
real life to maintain institutions and practices of oppression and 
domination. 52  It can also question the practical implications for this 
                                                     
46 Dryzek (n 42) 190–91. 
47 Dobson (n 42). 
48 MacGregor (n 43) 8. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (n 44).  
51 Warren, ‘Feminist Environmental Philosophy’ (n 45). 
52  E.g. Chris J Cuomo, Toward Thoughtful Ecofeminist Activism (Ecological 
Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press 1996); Kate Darling, ‘A Weight 
for Water: An Ecological Feminist Critique of Emerging Norms and Trends in 
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continued domination in social systems and institutions, including the 
global market economy, international environmental institutions, and 
through the implementation of international environmental law (IEL) and 
policy at the local level.53 Karen Warren articulates an ecofeminist theory 
that is “transformative” because it seeks to transform feminism and 
environmentalism, and guide broader social change.54 Her theory does two 
things: it gives an analysis of oppressive conceptual frameworks and how 
they reinforce interconnected institutions and practices. It also re-envisions 
the political strategies, theoretical positions, ethical frameworks, scientific 
understandings, and methodological approaches to develop peaceful and 
healthy social systems, communities, and people.55 These two aspects of 
her philosophy make it a sound basis from which to compare and critically 
evaluate international law relating to desertification and climate change. 
 
2.1 Introducing Karen Warren’s boundary conditions 
 
Warren’s vision of ecofeminist ethics is based on eight key boundary 
conditions. These are conditions “within which ethical decision-making 
may be seen as feminist.”56 As discussed in previous work, there are certain 
conditions that are particularly relevant to the analysis of IEL.57 These are 
outlined below before turning to explain how these conditions may be 
integrated into an analytical framework. 
Warren states that an ecofeminist ethic must be “anti-sexist, anti-racist, 
anti-classist, anti-naturist [sic], and opposed to any “ism” that presupposes 
                                                     
Global Water Governance’ (2012) 13 Melb J Int’l L 1; Greta Gaard, ‘Ecofeminism 
and Climate Change’ (2015) 49 Women’s Stud Int Forum 20.  
53 Kate Wilkinson, ‘Payment for Ecosystem Services and the Green Economy: 
Green Washing or Something New?’ (2014) 5 JHRE 168; Kate Wilkinson, ‘Is this 
the Future We Want? An Ecofeminist Comment on the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development Outcome Document’ in Kim Rubenstein and Katherine 
G Young (eds), The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global 
(Cambridge University Press 2016); Wilkinson Cross, ‘Ecofeminist Potentials’ (n 
8). 
54 Karen J Warren, ‘Response to My Critics’ (2002) 7 Ethics & the Environment 
39, 41.  
55 Ibid 42.  
56 Gaard (n 41) 2.  
57 Wilkinson, ‘Payment for Ecosystem Services’ (n 53); Wilkinson Cross, ‘The 
Environment as Commodity?’ (n 8); Wilkinson Cross, ‘Ecofeminist Potentials’ (n 
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or advances a logic of domination”58. It must be contextual and see ethical 
“discourse and practice as emerging from the “voices” of entities located in 
different historical circumstances”.59 Therefore, it is a “kind of narrative 
about humans, human-human relationships and human-non-human animal 
or nature relationships”.60 It places as centrally significant “how a moral 
agent is in relationship to another – and not simply the nature of the agent 
or ‘other’, or the rights, duties, and the rules that apply to the agent or 
“other””.61  
Her ecofeminist ethics are inclusivist. This means that it emerges from 
and reflects the diversity of perspectives of marginalised peoples and 
women. 62  As ecofeminism opposes the nature/culture dualism, it 
acknowledges that humans are members of an ecological community, but 
also different from other members. Therefore, ecofeminist ethics can 
recognise differences and commonalities between humans and non-human 
nature. 
Warren’s ethics “[provide] a central place for values typically 
unnoticed, underplayed, or misrepresented in traditional ethics”. 63 
Examples of such values include friendship, love or care. Her ethics 
emphasise that evaluating or deciding whether such values are useful or 
appropriate in any given discussion will depend on the context. For 
example, when discussing contracts or property relationships, then the talk 
of rights can be useful and appropriate. When deciding what is 
advantageous and cost-effective for most people, speaking about utility can 
be appropriate.  
Building on the above, ecofeminist ethics are “structurally plural” 
because they reject the assumption that there is one unified voice through 
which ethical values, beliefs, attitudes and conduct can be assessed. 64 
Therefore, they presuppose and maintain difference, both between humans 
as well as between humans and some elements of non-human nature.65 This 
means that her ethics affirm that humans are members of an ecological 
community (in some respects) while also being different from it. An 
important aspect for the analysis of international law is that Warren’s ethics 
                                                     
58 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy (n 7) 99.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid 99–100. 
63 Ibid 100.  
64 Ibid 139. 
65 Ibid 142. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
19 
pay attention to relationships and community, and the respectful 
acknowledgement of them. 
Finally, Warren’s ethics reject “gender-free or gender-neutral 
descriptions of humans, ethics and ethical decision-making”.66 This means 
that they reject “abstract individualism” which is the position “that it is 
possible to identify a human essence or human nature that exists 
independently of any particular historical context”.67 Therefore, her ethics 
recognise that relationships “play an essential role in shaping what it is to 
be human” and that relationships between humans and non-human nature 
are a constitutive aspect of what it is to be human.68 
Ecofeminist ethics are “care-sensitive ethics”. According to Warren, 
“care-sensitive ethics” have three features that must be met before ethical 
principles in Western philosophy can qualify as a “bona fide ethical 
position”.69 First, a central aspect of moral reasoning and motivation is the 
ability to care about others as well as oneself. Second, and building on the 
above features of an ecofeminist ethic, the universality of the ethical 
principles should be situated rather than ahistorical, transcendent and 
universal. Third, the appropriateness of the ethical principle in a given 
context is determined by the considerations of care. Therefore, traditional 
values such as utility, duty, and rights can be morally salient, so long as the 
application of the principle satisfies the three conditions of a care-sensitive 
ethic.  
As argued elsewhere, this aspect of her ecofeminist ethics is important 
for the analysis of IEL.70 This is because it provides the foundation to 
undertake a highly contextualised and nuanced analysis of the underlying 
assumptions and ethical principles that have informed the development of 
the two legal regimes.  
 
2.2 Introducing the ecofeminist analytical framework 
 
The first lens – inclusivity – incorporates the boundary conditions that 
seek to include entities traditionally excluded or “othered” by Western 
philosophy. The second lens – contextuality - draws out a central theme 
within the boundary conditions that focuses on historical context and how 
this informs social relations. It explores how the two regimes pay attention 
                                                     
66 Ibid 101.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid 143.  
69 Ibid 101.  
70 Wilkinson Cross, ‘The Environment as Commodity?’ (n 8) 108–14; Wilkinson 
Cross, ‘Ecofeminist Potentials’ (n 8) 209–10. 
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to history and context. It examines how certain values which are 
underplayed by traditional ethics are incorporated within the legal regimes. 
It pays particular attention to the context in which discussions of different 
ethical principles, such as utility and rights are raised, and if they emerge 
from voices located in different historical circumstances. Finally, it 
explores the extent to which the legal documents reject abstract 
individualism by recognising the historical context that plays a central role 
in shaping humanity, and shaping the norms and law created during that 
time.71  
The third lens – structural pluralism - explores how these regimes pay 
attention to and respect plurality between entities, states, and values. This 
theme is reflected in the boundary conditions that presuppose and maintain 
difference between humans, and between humans and non-human nature. 
It affirms that humans are members of an ecological community, and of 
different human, social communities.72 In the context of IEL, it enables a 
nuanced analysis of the ways in which the international community seeks 
to balance the different interests that relate to the environment in this area 
of law.73 In this analysis, I will be able to consider what this might mean 
about the diversity of views of the environment at the international level. 
Finally, it draws on criticisms by some writers and activists that there 
should be a “bottom-up” approach to the creation and implementation of 
IEL that accounts for diversity, location, and difference.74  
These three lenses, taken together, form an interconnecting framework 
through which to compare the transformative potential of the two 
international environmental regimes. Each has stronger synergies with 
differing aspects of international law-making and governance. For 
example, the inclusivity lens has stronger synergies in relation to the 
participation by different communities in the creation of international law 
and the subsequent implementation of obligations. Contextuality is relevant 
when exploring which issues are prioritised during the negotiations, and 
which other global regimes remain unaffected or distinct from the legal 
obligations within different environmental regimes. Structural pluralism 
focuses on how the regimes attend to differences between parties and other 
actors within the regime. As these lenses are interconnected and 
                                                     
71 Wilkinson Cross (n 53). 
72 Niamh Moore, ‘Eco/Feminism and Rewriting the End of Feminism: From the 
Chipko Movement to Clayoquot Sound’ (2011) 12 Fem Theory 3, 11. 
73 Wilkinson Cross (n 8) 111; Wilkinson Cross (n 8) 210. 
74 Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (Zed 1988); 
Dharam Ghai and Jessica M Vivian, Grassroots Environmental Action: People’s 
Participation in Sustainable Development (Routledge 1992); Sturgeon (n 44) 141–
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intersecting, they enable a recognition that different categories, such as 
participation, the inclusion of other international interests, and the way in 
which the environment is represented, bleed into each other, have their own 
intersections, and cannot be analysed independently from each other.  
 
3 COMPARING THE UNFCCC AND THE UNCCD  
 
This section compares the legal and policy documents of the UNFCCC 
and UNCCD through the analytical framework introduced above. Focusing 
on the principles, norms and obligations incorporated into the two regimes, 
the analysis suggests that the treatment of women, the environment, and the 
incorporation of science and technology within these two regimes simply 
reaffirms and extends the dominant conceptual frameworks informing the 
evolution of IEL. This ultimately inhibits the transformative potential 
contained in these two regimes because it limits the space for engaging in 
open and participative conversations about humanity, history, ethics and 
our position within broader ecological systems.  
 
3.1 Comparing the participation of marginalised communities and 
ecosystem services in the UNFCCC and UNCCD through the 
inclusivity lens  
 
The following section explores the transformative potentials of the two 
regimes by comparing two elements important to ecofeminist ethics: the 
participation by state and non-state actors in the creation and subsequent 
evolution of the two legal regimes; and how the two regimes approach 
material embodiment of humanity within an ecological community. It is 
argued that the failure to integrate a gender dimension into the regime until 
relatively recently, and the historically limited reference to inclusive 
participation in the creation and implementation of objectives within the 
climate regime each highlight the ways in which the regime does not 
eradicate the “isms” of domination or fully incorporate the voices of 
marginalised communities. The introduction of ecosystem services as a key 
element of both regimes suggests that they treat the ecosystem as a 
commodity. This in turn reinforces the separation between human and non-
human nature, thus legitimising the exploitation and commodification of 
non-human nature.  
 
3.1.1 Marginalised communities’ participation in the two regimes: 
comparing the transformative potential 
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The inclusion of traditionally marginalised communities during the 
creation of international agreements is a way in which states can seek to 
mitigate the “isms” of domination within the legal agreement. This is 
because it enables the voices of individuals who directly experience the 
impact of environmental degradation to be heard. Therefore, it can go in 
some way to identify how the assumptions informing different policies can 
detrimentally affect the lives of vulnerable communities by speaking truth 
to the ways in which broader social and economic structures maintain 
structural inequalities at the local level.  
During the drafting of the UNCCD, states explicitly invited participants 
from communities directly affected by drought and desertification. The 
intergovernmental negotiating committee tasked with drafting the UNCCD 
was openly inclusive, as demonstrated by devoting a week to information 
sharing, and also supporting the participation of NGOs to contribute 
“constructively to the success of the negotiating process”.75 Over the course 
of the negotiations, non-state actors met with state delegations formally and 
informally and they were successful in convincing governments to propose 
their ideas.76 For example, NGOs argued that national action plans should 
establish a participatory approach at the international level, and they should 
be allowed to attend conferences of the parties as observers, or any other 
decision-making body created.77 Both states and NSAs supported the full 
local participation in decision-making and incorporating an integrated, 
“bottom-up approach” to combating desertification. 78  This enabled the 
                                                     
75 United Nations General Assembly Res 47/188 (22 December 1992) UN Doc 
A/RES/47/188 para 8.  
76  UNCCD, ‘Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the 
Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification in Those 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in 
Africa on Its Second Session’ (15 October 1993) UN Doc A/48/226/Add.1 
Appendix III Report of Working Group I, para 15 and Appendix III Report of 
Working Group II, para 15; Michele Merrill Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, ‘NGO 
Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for 
Analysis’ (2001) 1 Global Environ Polit 65, 93–94.  
77 ENB, ‘Summary of the Second Session of the INC for the Elaboration of an 
International Convention to Combat Desertification: 13-24 September 1993’ 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1993) <http://www.iisd.ca/vol04/0422000e.html> 
accessed 30 January 2015.  
78 UNCCD, ‘Compilation of Government Views, Statement and Drafting 
Proposals. Note by the Secretariat’ (1993) UN Doc A/AC.241/12; Chasek (n 26) 
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different experiences, needs and values of local communities to inform the 
negotiations of the UNCCD.  
This open participation process was integrated into the legal text of the 
UNCCD as a central feature of the National Action Plans. These “NAPs” 
set out the ways in which affected country Parties will respond to the causes 
and effects of desertification and drought. Articles 9 and 10 emphasise the 
importance of incorporating bottom-up participatory approaches and 
specifically refer to women, resource uses, and local communities. 79 
Similarly, the regional annexes to the convention adopt this approach, 
although to a varying degree.80 For example, the Regional Annex for Africa 
makes direct reference to the role played by women and the importance of 
their participation, whereas the Regional Annex for Asia is not explicit in 
their references to the participation by marginalised communities.81 These 
provisions point to states supporting NSA participation in areas that relate 
to sustainable development and environmental degradation. 
Compared to the climate change regime, the UNCCD negotiating 
process offered more opportunities for non-state actors to contribute to the 
drafting of the Convention. The conference organisers engaged directly 
with those communities who were most affected by climate change. Not 
                                                     
79 UNCCD 1994 arts 9, 10(2), 10(2)(f). See also arts 3, 5(d), 17(1)(f), 18(2)(a), 
19(1)(a), 19(3)(b), 21(1)(d), 22(7); Geoffrey Lean, Down to Earth: A Simplified 
Guide to the Convention to Combat Desertification, Why It is Necessary and What 
is Important and Different about It (Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification 1995) 19; Alon Tal and Jessica A Cohen, ‘Bringing “Top-Down” 
to “Bottom-Up”: A New Role for Environmental Legislation in Combating 
Desertification’ (2007) 31 Harv Envtl L Rev 163, 177. 
80 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 
Annex I Regional Implementation Annex for Africa (adopted 17 June 1994, 
entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 arts 4(b), 6(2), 8(2)(c), 11(g); 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 
Annex II Regional Implementation Annex for Asia (adopted 17 June 1994, entered 
into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 art 4(d); United Nations Convention 
to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Annex III Regional Implementation Annex 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (adopted 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 
December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 art 4(l); United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Annex IV Regional Implementation Annex 
for the Northern Mediterranean (adopted 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 
December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 arts 3(2), 5(d).  
81 UNCCD 1994 Annex I (Africa) art 8(2)(c). 
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only does this continue to ensure that disadvantaged voices are heard, but 
also reflects a plurality of experiences contributing to the evolution of the 
regime. This openness and the explicit inclusion of traditionally 
marginalised communities as key participants in NAPs may indicate a 
commitment to address some of the “isms” of domination criticised by 
ecofeminists as it enabled voices generally excluded from the international 
sphere to speak and raise concerns over economic, social and political 
inequalities which compounded the effects of desertification. 
The above analysis indicates that the UNCCD was relatively successful 
at enabling the voices and experiences of traditionally marginalised and 
excluded communities to be heard during the negotiating process. This 
opportunity was transformative because it incorporated inclusive 
references that obliged state parties to provide for the participation by 
groups, such as women, who have traditionally been excluded from 
international institutions. These references mean that women, local 
communities and indigenous communities are also involved in the 
subsequent development of policy and institutions related to the UNCCD. 
However, compared to the UNCCD, the UNFCCC has been slow to enable 
the voices of traditionally marginalised groups to contribute to the 
institutional evolution. This is because it omitted certain Major Groups 
from gaining official observer status. “Major Groups” are the nine sectors 
of society recognised by Agenda 21 as the main channels through which 
broad participation would be facilitated in UN activities related to 
sustainable development. They include, inter alia, Women, Children and 
Youth, Indigenous Peoples, Business and Industry, and Non-Governmental 
Organisations.82 In order to participate actively in meetings, they need to 
be granted official observer status according to the provisions of the treaty.  
Article 4 UNFCCC places broad obligations on parties to adopt an 
expanded approach to participation. However, there is no such obligation 
for the Convention’s institutions.83  Certain Major Groups were granted 
official observer status from the outset. These Groups included 
environmental NGOs, and business and industry NGOs.84  Other Major 
Groups, such as local government and municipal authorities, and 
indigenous peoples, were granted official recognition in 1995 and 2001 
respectively. The Women’s Major Group had to wait until 2011 before 
                                                     
82 Agenda 21 1992 Ch 24-32.  
83 UNFCCC 1992 art 4.  
84  Karen Morrow, ‘Integrating Gender Issues into the Global Climate Change 
Regime’ in Susan Buckingham and Virginie Le Masson (eds), Understanding 
Climate Change through Gender Relations (Routledge 2017).  
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being granted official recognition by the regime.85 To date, the Farmer’s 
Major Group remains subject to provisional recognition.86 The delay in 
officially recognising all major groups indicates a prioritisation and 
valorisation of voices and experiences from particular backgrounds, such 
as technology, business and trade. 
The slow inclusion of the Women’s Major Group and Farmers Major 
Group gives insight about which voices and whose experiences were valued 
during the evolution of the climate change regime. It highlights that the 
international community were slow to recognise gender as an important 
constituency for responses to climate change in the institutional machinery 
of the UNFCCC regime.87 For one thing, it means that the diverse interests, 
expertise and experiences of women are omitted from the information 
gathering processes, and from informing the negotiations. Second, without 
having a platform for women’s expertise, interests and experiences, it is 
more difficult for stakeholders to highlight the interconnecting ways in 
which climate change disproportionately impacts and affects women and 
other marginalised communities. 
For example, women make up 48% of the agricultural labour force in 
developing countries.88 This percentage is likely to grow because of the 
increased feminisation of agriculture as a result of “increased urbanization, 
the migration of many young men to the cities, commercial farming growth, 
conflict, and climate change”. 89  Rural women in particular are 
disproportionately affected by climate change because they undertake a 
higher proportion of social reproductive work, such as childcare and 
collecting firewood and water. 90  The slow recognition of gender as a 
constituency and the continued failure to officially recognise the Farmers 
Major Group has a gendered impact, as it excludes the voices and 
                                                     
85 FCCC, ‘Non-Governmental Organisation Constituencies’ (2011) 
<https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_
2011_english.pdf> accessed 7 March 2018.  
86 FCCC, ‘UNFCCC Constituency Focal Points’ Contact Details’ (2018). 
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88 FAO, ‘Why is Gender Equality and Rural Women’s Empowerment Central to 
the Work of FAO’ (Gender, 2018) <http://www.fao.org/gender/background/en/> 
accessed 18 May 2018.  
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Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, 2017) 2. 
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experiences of people who are disproportionately affected by climate 
change while also being the closest to the land that is degraded. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, there are some signs of change within the 
UNFCCC, particularly in relation to integrating gender considerations into 
UNFCCC work.  
 
Integrating a gender perspective: the adoption of Gender Action Plans 
by the UNCCD and the UNFCCC  
 
Like the UNCCD, there has been some substantive progress with 
regards to gender in the UNFCCC after the grant of constituency status for 
the Women’s Major Group in 2011. Unlike the earlier UNFCCC and the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2015 Paris Agreement refers to gender equality 
and the empowerment of women in its preamble, and in the context of 
climate change adaptation (article 7) and capacity building (article 11).91 
Decision 3/CP.23 establishes a Gender Action Plan (GAP) which 
“recognises the need for women to be represented in all aspects of the 
UNFCCC process and the need for gender mainstreaming through all 
relevant targets and goals in activities under the Convention as an important 
contribution to increasing their effectiveness”.92 The GAP lists four priority 
areas: capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and communication; gender-
balance, participation and women’s leadership; coherence, gender-
responsive implementation and means of implementation; and monitoring 
and reporting. These priority areas reflect the goal of embedding gender 
considerations into all activities undertaken by the climate change regime. 
The GAP provides “quick win” solutions, such as promoting travel 
funds as a means to support the participation of women in national 
delegations, and organising and conducting capacity-building training on 
leadership and negotiation skills.93 It aims to enhance the capacity of Parties 
and stakeholders to develop “gender responsive policies, plans and 
programmes on adaption, mitigation, capacity-building technology and 
finance” through, inter alia, workshops and technical assistance.94 It also 
aims to hold a dialogue on the implementation of commitments to integrate 
gender into areas such as access to finance, technology needs assessments, 
                                                     
91 Paris Agreement arts 11(3)-11(5). 
92 Decision 3/CP23 ‘Establishment of a Gender Action Plan’ (17 November 2017) 
FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add1 Annex para 3. 
93 Ibid annex 16.  
94 Ibid annex 16. 
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and budgeting. 95  These activities focus on improving the current 
institutional framework, structures and policies in order to ensure that they 
are able to respond to gender concerns. The GAP also identifies the need to 
share experiences in how Parties and observer organisations have promoted 
the systematic integration of gender considerations into issues such as 
mitigation and adaptation activities.96  These examples indicate that the 
GAP recognises that stakeholders, such as women’s rights organisations, 
indigenous women representatives and other actors, should be involved to 
ensure an inclusive and open dialogue.97  
Nevertheless, the content of the GAP and the Paris Agreement both 
suggest that state Parties and the institutional machinery of the UNFCCC 
have not engaged with the conceptual and structural elements of the climate 
change problem which continue to exclude and devalue women. The 
activities outlined in the GAP ensure that data is produced and there is a 
greater understanding of the impact of climate change on gender, but they 
do not engage with the conceptual and structural barriers that continue to 
exclude and devalue women within the spheres that are prioritised in the 
climate change: technology, financing, business, and trade. Instead, the 
GAP seeks to empower women by integrating gender considerations into 
all activities of the UNFCCC, which may not offer the opportunity to 
critique the underlying assumptions that inform these activities, and what 
they may say about the relationship between humanity and the 
environment. Therefore, the extent to which it can engage with 
transformation ecofeminist ethics remains limited.  
The UNCCD has also recognised the importance of integrating a gender 
perspective in the implementation of the Convention. Parties to the 
UNCCD and stakeholders have acted on gender since 1998 and have 
repeatedly called for consistent gender balance in civil society participation 
and within the roster of independent experts. Parties and stakeholders have 
evaluated the actions in support of women and women’s groups, particular 
those undertaken at the local level. 98  Building from these reports, the 
Parties have requested the UNCCD secretariat to promote gender through 
its policy-advocacy framework, and to mainstream gender issues at 
different levels and with the involvement of multiple stakeholders.99 In 
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2017, the COP adopted a decision explicitly acknowledging that 
mainstreaming gender in the implementation of the Convention will 
strengthen its effectiveness and efficiency at the local level. 100 
The UNCCD adopts a social reproductive perspective in the Gender 
Plan of Action (GPA). It identifies that women are “strategic agents of 
change”101 and acknowledges the structural inequalities embedded in the 
“social, political, economic and cultural institutions, norms and practices” 
that limit women’s agency and undermine the effective implementation of 
the Convention.102 In response to these findings, the GPA intends to “make 
the implementation of the Convention … gender-responsive and 
transformative … by providing guidance to Parties and other actors on 
policies and measures to mainstream gender …”103 The GPA states that 
women must benefit from any interventions and they should not increase 
women’s burden.104  
The GPA outlines four key priorities for action, which cover women’s 
participation in decisions to implement the UNCCD, integrating women’s 
economic empowerment in these activities, strengthening women’s land 
rights and access to resources, and enhancing women’s access to 
knowledge and technology. 105  Mechanisms for implementation include 
“working with and through women’s organisations”, developing strategic 
partnerships, mobilising financial resources, and monitoring and reporting 
on the interventions.106 These provisions are more progressive because they 
place the barriers to participation in a broader context that takes into 
account the need to establish foundations for women’s empowerment.  
Therefore, compared to the GAP, the GPA incorporates a more 
transformative approach towards gender recognition and gender 
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mainstreaming in the UNCCD. This is because it starts from a position 
which recognises the structural barriers faced by women. Unlike the 
UNFCCC, which focuses on improving existing institutional processes and 
developing ways to incorporate women within them, the GPA focuses on 
the local level and addressing barriers to implementation there. 
Furthermore, by approaching the barriers facing women from a social 
reproductive perspective, the GPA has adopted a more critical and nuanced 
perspective from which to start. This indicates a greater engagement with 
the problems faced by women experiencing drought and desertification.  
The above comparison of the treatment of women within the two 
regimes indicates that the UNCCD incorporates more transformational 
participatory provisions than the UNFCCC. The UNCCD recognises that 
different communities and members of society are disproportionately 
affected by drought and desertification, depending on a number of factors. 
It has embedded inclusive participation within its provisions, the NAPs and 
within the institutional structure itself. It recognises and values the 
experiences of marginalised communities, particularly women, and as such, 
the participation reflects a bottom-up approach to developing and 
implementing the agreement. Therefore, these provisions indicate a more 
transformative approach to responding to drought and desertification 
because they enable the experiences, needs and values of women to inform 
the evolution of the regime. 
However, with the recognition that gender is an important constituent 
of climate change and with the introduction of the Gender Action Plan, the 
UNFCCC may be “catching up” to the UNCCD. As it currently stands, the 
focus of the climate change regime is integration and mainstreaming gender 
considerations across all work streams. This focus does not allow much 
opportunity to engage in more conceptual and transformational debate 
about why women and other marginalised communities are 
disproportionately affected, what that says about human/non-human 
relationships understood within the regime, and what this may tell us about 
current strategies towards responding to the issue. 
 
3.1.2 Integrating ecosystems services into the regimes: reinforcing the 
human/nature divide? 
 
Ecofeminist ethics also acknowledge that humanity is embedded within 
ecological systems, rather than separate and distanced from it. 107  For 
ecofeminism, any international regime or legal agreement that recognises 
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the embeddedness of humanity in non-human nature would be 
transformational. However, very little IEL includes strong language that 
acknowledges the embeddedness of humanity within a broader ecological 
system. Instead, it emphasises the second aspect of this relationship, 
namely that humanity is different and distinct from non-human nature and 
adopts an anthropocentric worldview. 
This anthropocentric worldview places human beings and their interests 
as the central consideration when addressing environmental concerns. It 
legitimises the exploitation of non-human nature because it is seen as other, 
separate and distinct from humanity. Val Plumwood extends this critique 
and argues that historically, anthropocentrism and androcentricsm have 
been “intimately connected” within the western philosophical tradition.108 
Androcentricsm refers to “male-centred thinking that assumes the 
superiority of men over women,” that “naturalises and justifies a certain 
sort of self-centredness, self-imposition, and dispossession, [and] 
provides… a very distorted framework for perception of the other.”109 An 
anthropocentric framework is built on logical structures which create a 
“false universalism in culture in which the experiences of the dominant 
“centre” are represented as universal, and the experiences of those 
subordinated in the structure are rendered as secondary, or irrational”.110 
Applying this analysis to the context of IEL, the emphasis of difference and 
othering, also enables non-human nature to be translated into commodities 
or entities and objects that serve a purpose or function for the benefit of 
(certain categories of) humanity.  
 
Incentivising conservation through the commodification of nature  
 
One way in which this perspective has been incorporated within the two 
environmental regimes is through the introduction of “ecosystem services” 
as way to incentivise the conservation of important ecological functions 
that are necessary for the survival of humanity.111 Ecological functions are 
the “interacting biological, chemical and physical processes that underpin 
                                                     
108  Val Plumwood, ‘Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental 
Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism’ (1991) 6 Hypatia 3, 22.  
109  Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason 
(Routledge 2002) 118.  
110 Ibid 99.  
111 Jose Puppim de Oliveira and others, Governing the Forests: An Institutional 
Analysis of REDD+ and Community Forest Management in Asia (United Nations 
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the provision of ecosystem services”.112 Ecosystem services are understood 
as “the benefits that people obtain from ecosystems”. 113  They include 
provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services – all of which are 
defined in relation to humanity.114 Payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
are schemes that incentivise the conservation of ecological services for 
future generations while also promoting economic growth and development 
in developing countries.115  
The concept of ecosystem services has been incorporated within the 
climate change regime in the context of land use, land-use change and 
forestry activities.116 In 2007, the COP adopted the Bali Action Plan which 
outlined a commitment to consider “policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries”.117 Subsequent COP decisions refined the reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) mechanism and made 
the financial incentivisation more explicit.118 This is a voluntary climate 
change mitigation approach that incentivises developing countries to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.  
The Paris Agreement incorporates REDD+ and the concept of 
ecosystem services in article 5. This provision encourages parties to “take 
action to implement and support, including through results-based 
                                                     
112  Barron J Orr and others, ‘Scientific Conceptual Framework for Land 
Degradation Neutrality: A Report of the Science-Policy Interface.’ (UNCCD-SPI 
Technical Series No.01, 2017) 13.  
113 Ibid; Walter V Reid and others, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis 
(Island Press 2005).  
114 Orr and others (n 112) 13.  
115 Wilkinson, ‘Payment for Ecosystem Services’ (n 53) 169.  
116 UNFCCC 1992 art 4(1)(d); Kyoto Protocol art 2.  
117  Decision 1/CP13 ‘Bali Action Plan’ (14-15 December 2007) 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add1* para 1(b)(iii).  
118  Decision 2/CP15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’ (18 December 2009) 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add1; Decision 1/CP16 ’The Cancún Agreements: Outcome 
of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (10-11 December 2010) FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add1; Decision 
2/CP17 ‘Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention’ (11 December 2011) 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add1; See also FCCC, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
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Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 15 December 2009’ (5 February 2010) 
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payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and 
decisions already agreed under the Convention”.119 Therefore, while the 
Agreement does not explicitly refer to PES, it does include references to 
incentivising states through economic reward to conserve and protect 
important ecological functions.  
Current negotiations under the Paris Agreement indicate that REDD+ 
will be incorporated into developing countries’ intended nationally 
determined contributions (INDCs), as well as voluntary cooperation.120 The 
continued integration of results-based payments, PES and ecosystem 
services highlights that that the anthropocentric worldview, with its 
underlying value dualism that separates human/nature thus legitimising the 
commoditisation of nature, continues to inform international responses to 
climate change mitigation. This perception of the environment is further 
reflected in the language in the Paris Agreement, which refers to forests as 
“sinks” or reservoirs for greenhouses gases. This is a reductive view of the 
environment, which views non-human nature as a “sink”, and something to 
be used for human interests, rather than recognises that human activities are 
embedded and reliant on continued ecological functions of ecosystems. The 
extension of this worldview is the assumption that communities need to be 
“incentivised” or “rewarded” for its conservation.  
This anthropocentric worldview is not restricted to the climate change 
regime. The desertification regime also promotes the use of ecosystem 
services as a solution to protect degrading ecosystems while maintaining 
economic growth and achieving sustainable development objectives. The 
UNCCD has embedded the concept of ecosystem services into many of its 
strategies for achieving the objectives of the Convention.  
One of the strategic objectives of the desertification regime is to 
improve land productivity and related ecosystem services.121 In the context 
of the UNCCD, the goal of land degradation neutrality refers to the goal of 
maintaining or enhancing the “stocks of natural capital associated with land 
resources and the ecosystems that flow from them.”122 In this conceptual 
framework, ecosystem functions have been transformed into “services” that 
                                                     
119 Paris Agreement art 5(2). 
120  FCCC, ‘Non-Market-Based Approaches: Technical Paper’ (24 November 
2017) FCCC/TP/2014/10; see also Peter Graham, ‘Cooperative Approaches for 
Supporting REDD+: Linking Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris Agreement’ (Climate 
Advisors, 2017) 6. 
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can be “delivered” in order to achieve sustainable food production.123 These 
services are performed for the benefit of human kind, particularly as an 
“engine of economic growth and a source of livelihood for billions 
worldwide”. 124  Thus, ecosystem services are explicitly defined as the 
“benefits” humanity obtains from ecosystems. 125  More generally, non-
human nature is referred to as “natural capital” that can be harnessed for 
sustainable development. 126  This language, informed by economics, 
highlights the underlying logic that places humanity at the centre, and 
associated functions are defined in terms of humanity’s needs.  
The concept of “ecosystem services” itself is “indicative of an 
exploitative and androcentric construction of the living order which 
continues to perpetuate a hierarchical way of thinking that separates 
humans from nature and reduces nature as subordinate”. 127  As I have 
argued elsewhere, by redefining ecological functions as services, 
international policy and discourse “recasts nature as providing a “service” 
to humanity, without any interrogation of the gendered and exploitative 
ideology implicit in the language”.128  In addition, it may be seen as a 
manifestation of economic rationalism because it seeks to translate the 
protection of the environment itself into an economic process, thereby 
disembedding ecosystems themselves. The above examples from both 
regimes reveal that the conceptual frameworks and logical structures 
informing these policies continue to view the environment as separate and 
subordinate, therefore legitimising its exploitation and reinforcing its value 
as a commodity or resource for economic gain.  
The preceding comparison between the UNFCCC and the UNCCD 
highlights that both incorporate anthropocentric and androcentric 
perspectives towards non-human nature. Both regimes have incorporated 
the concept of ecosystem services as ways in which to achieve the 
objectives of the regimes. It has highlighted how this concept positions 
humans as central and non-human nature as subordinate and as a resource 
to be used for human purposes. Therefore, the extent to which these two 
                                                     
123 Ibid. 
124 UNCCD, ‘Land and Sustainable Development Goals’ (ND)  
<https://www.unccd.int/issues/land-and-sustainable-development-goals> 
accessed 23 March 2018.  
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regimes are transformational or incorporate ecofeminist ethics in this 
context is limited.  
 
3.2 Comparing approaches towards science and technology in the 
UNFCCC and UNCCD: do they recognise context or location?  
 
Both the UNCCD regime and the UNFCCC prioritise scientific 
cooperation, technological assistance and transfer, and addressing the 
impact of environmental degradation on commercial activities. However, 
the way in which these areas are integrated into the regimes, and the 
justifications for their integration are different. These variances include the 
subject matter, recognition of the broader context of the environmental 
issue, and the type of actors involved in the negotiations. The analysis 
suggests that these two regimes demonstrate a sense of optimism about 
technological innovation and commit to a future potential where science, 
technology and know-how will be able to mitigate environmental 
degradation and enable communities to adapt to existing environmental 
problems, while also allowing states to continue to develop through 
exploitative production. This optimistic outlook on the role of science and 
technology fails to take into account how mechanised science and the 
global market economy is informed by the logical structures which view 
women and non-human nature as “other” and objects for exploitation, to 
the detriment of all communities.  
 
3.2.1 Prioritising science, technology and commerce  
 
The UNFCCC has prioritised the consideration of scientific, 
commercial, and technological implications of climate change. This is 
reflected within the negotiations of the UNFCCC and in the subsequent 
evolution of the regime. During the negotiations of the UNFCCC, Austria 
and Switzerland proposed that the commitments in the Convention should 
promote the “development and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies, and technical as well as financial assistance.”129 Other parties 
also supported the inclusion of cooperation by “means of systematic and 
                                                     
129 FCCC, ‘Compilation of Proposals Related to Commitments Submitted by the 
Bureau of Working Group I’ (15 August 1991) A/AC.237/Misc.7 Part A(I.1) 3-4; 
FCCC, ‘Preparation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change: Set of 
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sustained research … in order to better understand the causes and impacts 
of climate change and the response strategies required to deal with such 
change.”130 These examples highlight that the need to understand the issue 
of climate change was directly linked to the need to prove that it was a 
problem that required global action to counteract.  
One reason for emphasising the importance of continued scientific 
understanding of climate change is the need to overcome obstacles in the 
negotiating process. The causes of climate change are deeply embedded in 
all aspects of the world’s economic and social activities from the developed 
to the developing world. These activities include transportation, industry, 
international trade, agriculture, fishing and forestry practice, to name a 
few. 131  Climate change scepticism meant that there was reluctance to 
commit to reducing emissions because of the detrimental impact on all 
aspects of society, until there was certainty of the existence of climate 
change and that it would have a destructive effect on societies.132 State 
submissions during the negotiations of the UNFCCC indicate that scientific 
and technical cooperation were central features of the future climate change 
regime, both to enable buy-in from reluctant states, and as a way to maintain 
and consolidate cooperation.  
The climate change regime has continued to emphasise the role of 
science and technology as a way to consolidate cooperation within the 
regime. Systematic observation of the climate system is seen as the “the 
foundation for our understanding of climate change and its associated 
impacts, and helps scientists determine future trends”133 while also being a 
way in which Parties can cooperate in data gathering and systematically 
observing the climate system.134 Similarly, Article 4(1) UNFCCC calls for 
parties to “promote and cooperate in the development, application and 
                                                     
130 FCCC, ‘Compilation of Proposals Related to Commitments, A/AC237/Misc7’ 
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of Global Warming’ (1991) 15 Int Security 110, 121.  
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diffusion, including transfer, of technologies…that control, reduce or 
prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases…”135  Subsequent 
COP decisions and legal agreements have similarly affirmed the potential 
of sci-tech to provide the foundation of our understanding of the issues, and 
also as a way to “improve resilience to climate change and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions”.136  
The focus within the climate change regime on addressing science and 
technology indicates that many participants in the negotiation process 
viewed climate change as primarily scientific and technical in nature and 
therefore resolvable through innovation.137 This is an optimistic view of the 
role of science and technology in which current, potential, and future 
developments will be able to “solve” or “fix” the harm that humanity has 
caused, while maintaining the overarching goals of economic growth, 
poverty eradication and sustainable development. This view is reflected in 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, which associated the promotion of 
sustainable development with the development and transfer of new 
technologies to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change while 
also ensuring the sustainable economic development of party states. 138 
During the subsequent evolution of the climate change regime, COP 
decisions have introduced new financial and trade mechanisms to support 
technical development for climate change mitigation and adaptation, and 
article 10 of the Paris Agreement explicitly states that technology and 
scientific innovation is “critical for an effective, long-term global response 
to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable 
development”. 139  These examples indicate that the content of COP 
                                                     
135 UNFCCC 1992 art 4(1)(c).  
136 Paris Agreement art 10(1).  
137 E.g. FCCC, ‘Strengthening the Commitments in Article 4.2(A) and (B) Policies 
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decisions and Agreements continues to associate potential technological 
and scientific advances that allow for continued economic growth in the 
context of sustainable development.  
The UNCCD also incorporates a significant number of references to 
scientific and technological advancements in relation to drought and 
desertification. Under article 17, parties undertake to “promote technical 
and scientific cooperation in the fields of combating desertification and 
mitigating the effects of drought”.140 Similarly, under article 18, parties 
undertake to “promote, finance and/or facilitate the financing of the transfer 
… adaptation and development of environmentally sound, economically 
viable and socially acceptable technologies relevant to combating 
desertification and/or mitigating the effects of drought”.141 Thus far, the 
two environmental regimes demonstrate similar commitments to the 
promotion of technology and science as a way to ensure cooperation and to 
support the ability of developing countries to achieve their obligations 
under the convention.  
Both the legal regimes demonstrate a level of “techno-optimism”142 by 
which I mean that actors within the regimes champion the potential of 
science and technology to repair and alleviate environmental damage.143 
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Ecofeminists are resistant to the narrative that science and technology can 
achieve this feat.144 This resistance stems from their critique of science and 
its associated mechanistic analysis of reality. This new definition of reality 
is based on assumptions of ontology, epistemology, context independence 
and identity that is analogous to the structure of machines. They argue that 
this mechanistic understanding of reality is the “legitimising ideology of 
industrial capitalism and its inherent ethic of the domination of nature.”145 
From the scientific revolution onwards, science has viewed as “objective, 
value-free, context-free knowledge of the external world.” 146  Like 
machines, order and power are integral components of this mechanical 
worldview and sanctioned the management of both nature and society.147 
Thus, nature is ripe to be transformed or altered for the needs and benefit 
of humanity, or more specifically, the needs of men.148 Ecofeminists argue 
that this mechanistic worldview, which renders nature as inert and passive 
has completed infiltrated and reformed human consciously completely so 
that we rarely question its validity.149  
The impact of this worldview is that nature, humans and society are 
seen to be made up of interchangeable parts that can be externally repaired 
or replaced. It allows humans to remain outside of nature, as intellectual 
beings who calculate the maximum satisfaction or utility of nature. 
Plumwood argues that in this worldview, other species appear through a 
“reductive and human-centred framework, in a rationalised and 
commodified form.”150 This worldview also informs capitalist economics, 
which have “beatified a contractual, privileged and rationally 
“autonomous” master subject” who is separate from, and above nature.151 
From this, it can be argued that the focus on science and technological 
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innovation displayed in the UNFCCC and UNCCD can be interpreted as 
the desire to fix ecological malfunctions in order to maintain “the smooth 
functioning of industry and bureaucracy…” 152  which allows certain 
privileged forms of humanity to remain outside of nature, as intellectual 
beings and benefit from the embedded and embodied labour of non-human 
nature and women.  
The preceding discussion argues that the mechanistic worldview 
privileges objective, value-free and context-free knowledge, which has 
legitimised the exploitation of non-human nature and human others 
associated with nature. While the UNCCD does embody aspects of this 
worldview through its uncritical promotion of technological cooperation 
and advancement, it also includes provisions that take into account the 
context in which science and technology will be used by local communities 
and local populations. Under article 17, the Parties to the UNCCD should 
support research activities that address specific needs of local populations 
and “lead to the … implementation of solutions that improve the living 
standards of people in affected areas.” 153  Similarly, research activities 
should “protect, integrate, enhance and validate traditional knowledge and 
local knowledge…” 154  With regards to technology development and 
transfer, Parties shall “facilitate access … on favourable terms … to 
technologies most suitable to practical application for specific needs of 
local populations, paying special attention to the social, cultural, economic 
and environmental impact of such technology.” 155  It also calls for the 
protection of traditional and local technology, knowledge and practices.156 
In addition, the connection between technology transfer and local 
communities” participation is also reaffirmed in article 10, which 
introduces the National Action Programmes (NAP). It states that NAPs 
shall promote policies and institutional frameworks that “develop 
cooperation and coordination, in a spirit of partnership, between the donor 
community, governments at all levels, local populations and community 
groups, and facilitate access by local populations to appropriate information 
and technology.”157 These examples highlight that the focus for the use of 
such technology is on the local populations and that parties should take into 
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account the context in which such technology and scientific improvements 
will be used. 158 
 
3.2.2 Recognising interactions between communities and technology 
 
Furthermore, the subsequent evolution of the UNCCD indicates that 
there is increasing recognition of the differences in values, principles, and 
experiences of the environment that may alter the ways in which “other” 
communities perceive and use the environment. One particular example is 
the references to the “special relationship” between indigenous peoples and 
local communities and their environment. The Committee for the Review 
of the Implementation of the Convention (CRIC) acknowledged the 
potential cultural and socioeconomic implications of desertification and 
drought strategies.159 The reports include the recognition that initiatives for 
natural resource management should respect cultural specificities, while 
also “promoting the customary land tenures of local communities, [and] 
strengthening and legalizing their traditional institutions.” 160  Similarly, 
more recent decisions have encouraged parties to take “action at a specific 
spatial scale so as to address the local ecological and socio-economic 
conditions in a more holistic manner.”161 These statements indicate that, in 
the context of the desertification regime, some parties recognise that 
desertification and drought strategies may marginalise some communities. 
By explicitly linking management strategies to cultural specificities, these 
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references take into account the differences between communities and 
groups. 
The language in the UNFCCC regime reflects a more dispassionate and 
technical approach towards embedding technology within communities. 
Many of the COP decisions relating to technology transfer focus on 
epistemic communities separate and above local communities. For 
example, in Decision 1/CP.21, the parties request the “Technology 
Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network” to 
“engage in the technical expert meetings and enhance their efforts to 
facilitate and support Parties in scaling up the implementation of policies, 
practices and actions identified during this process.”162 The Paris Climate 
Agreement similarly states that “Parties share a long-term vision on the 
importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order 
to improve resilience to climate change.”163 These examples indicate that 
the climate change regime has not yet properly engaged in the ways in 
which the focus on technology and science is disembedded and 
disembodied from the ecological world and communities.164 This means 
that such initiatives are unlikely to be effective unless the focus becomes 
more embodied within the ecological world. 
However, recent publications indicate that UNFCCC institutions are 
integrating a more contextual approach towards science and technology 
implementation. For example, the GAP identifies that gender-responsive 
climate policy should be strengthened through technology development and 
transfer. 165  Technology and capacity building have been identified as 
priority areas, and will be incorporated into technology needs 
assessments. 166  Finally, the GAP also calls for submissions on the 
integration of gender considerations into technology and finance policies to 
be sex-disaggregated and provide a gender analysis.167 These examples 
highlight that the parties are starting to recognise that different 
communities, members of communities and groups use technology in 
different ways. Therefore, understanding the context in which technology 
and know-how will be rolled out is central to developing effective 
mitigation and adaptation strategies. Similarly, Decision 2/CP.23 
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recognises the need to strengthen the technologies of local communities and 
indigenous peoples in a holistic and integrated manner.168 This approach, 
which focuses on knowledge sharing and the exchange of experiences, 
suggests that the UNFCCC may be starting to take into account the 
differences between communities and groups based on their specificities. 
The preceding discussion compared two manifestations of context 
within the UNFCCC and the UNCCD. The first compared how the two 
regimes referred to science and technology within their foundational legal 
texts. Both regimes emphasise the importance of science and technology to 
“solve” or “mitigate” the consequences of environmental degradation. This 
demonstrated a sense of “technological optimism” that is embedded within 
the mechanistic worldview criticised by ecofeminism because it reduces 
non-human nature to something inert and dead, thus allowing its 
exploitation for the pursuit of industry and capitalism. This allows certain 
privileged groups of humanity to remain outside of nature, as enlightened, 
intellectual beings who benefit from the embedded and embodied labour of 
non-human nature and (some) women. 
Nevertheless, compared to the UNFCCC, the UNCCD regime has 
recognised that science and technology development should take into 
account the context in which they will be used. The provisions in the 
UNCCD explicitly refer to the location, peoples and communities who will 
be using and adapting the technology. In this way, the regime embodies 
some aspects of ecofeminist ethics by recognising that the cultural and 
historic specificities of groups affect how the technologies are integrated 
and impact on their daily lives.  
This comparison suggests that the UNCCD regime has generally been 
more aware of context in how it integrates considerations of science and 
technology within its legal framework. Nevertheless, both regimes 
demonstrate a continued affirmation that science and technology are the 
primary solutions to existing environmental problems, without recognising 
that the assumptions informing these types of knowledge are based on a 
view of non-human nature and associated human communities as resources 
and commodities to be exploited for the benefit of humankind.  
 
3.3 Attending to and respecting difference in the UNFCCC and the 
UNCCD 
 
The final lens of the analytical framework extends the above analysis 
even further and explores how the two regimes pay attention to and respect 
                                                     
168 Decision 2/CP23 ‘Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform’ (17 
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difference between different groups. The following comparison explores 
how the two regimes seek to balance the often-competing interests of equity 
and historical responsibility for environmental degradation, economic 
development, and difference in capabilities in performing obligations 
within environmental regimes.  
 
3.3.1 Respecting difference: integrating common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the two regimes 
 
These tensions are embodied in the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and its articulation in the climate 
change regime as common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC). CBDR recognises extra-legal differences among 
states” and makes “room for substantive equity in international 
environmental regimes.” 169  Comparing how this principle has been 
integrated into the two environmental regimes demonstrates that both 
environmental regimes recognise and respect the pluralities amongst 
countries by taking into account economic and historically driven 
differences between countries. However, the extent to which more recent 
iterations of CBDR demonstrate the transformative potential of ecofeminist 
ethics is less certain. 
The two regimes recognise difference and pluralities of experience by 
acknowledging the historic responsibility for environmental degradation 
and the resulting economic inequalities that impair developing countries 
from implementing their objectives. CBDR/CBDRRC contains two 
dimensions: that all states are to participate and do their share to ameliorate 
global environmental problems (common responsibility), and second that 
some states are in a much better position than others to provide the 
resources to addresses environmental problems.170 Therefore, it integrates 
references to historic responsibility of developed states while also basing 
the future contributions by developing countries on their capabilities. In 
doing so, it tries to reconcile the need for universal action to combat global 
problems and the need to be sensitive to individual states” special and 
relevant circumstances. The integration of differences and, to some extent, 
the acknowledgement of structural inequalities between states, embodies 
plurality because they pay attention to, and respect differences between the 
                                                     
169  Tuula Honkonen, ‘The Development of the Principle of Common but 
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parties, while acknowledging that there are still connections through the 
shared responsibilities to respond to environmental problems. 
 
Analysing the transformative potential of CBDRRC in the UNFCCC 
 
CBDRRC is explicitly integrated into the climate change regime as one 
of its guiding principles. Article 3(1) UNFCCC states that Parties should 
protect the climate system “on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” and “the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”171 This “radical 
differentiation” has been reinforced within the Kyoto Protocol and in the 
Paris Agreement, albeit in a different format.172  
The Kyoto Protocol includes explicit and implied references to 
CBDRRC within its text.173 It differentiates between developed countries, 
and between developed and developing countries in terms of the targets 
they should achieve, 174  and also in terms of the compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms.175 This differentiation placed a firewall between 
developed and developing countries within the Protocol, which has been 
softened in the subsequent evolution of the regime and the Paris 
Agreement.176 Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement reflects a more qualified 
understanding of differentiation. It refers to “equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.”177 In this way, differentiation can be interpreted 
in light of contemporary economic realities, and thus has evolved to take 
                                                     
171 UNFCCC 1992, art 3(1).  
172 Decision 1/CP1 (7 April 1995) FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add, paras 2(a), 2(b); Kyoto 
Protocol, arts 3, 5, 7, 8, 10(1); Clare Breidenich et al, ‘The Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (1998) 92 AJIL 315; 
Joanna Depledge, ‘Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-By-
Article Textual History’ (25 November 2000) FCCC/TP/2000/2 42.  
173  Kyoto Protocol preamble, art 10(1); see also Decision 1/CP1 The Berlin 
Mandate, paras 2(a), 2(b).  
174 Kyoto Protocol, arts 3, 5, 7, 8. 
175 Decision 27/CMP1 ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under 
the Kyoto Protocol’ (9-10 December 2005) FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add3 (2005); 
Bodansky et al (n 29) 167. 
176  Hermann E Ott, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Unfinished Business’ (1998) 40 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 16; Depledge (n 
173) 42. 
177 Paris Agreement, art 2(2). 
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account of the concerns about CBDRRC by developed countries. 178 
Therefore, the differentiation embedded in the Paris Agreement is more 
nuanced, but still remains focused on the economic capacity of states.  
The operationalisation of the Paris Agreement is through the 
preparation, communication and maintenance of contributions towards the 
overall purpose of the Agreement.179 These are known as “NDCs” and are 
expected to progress every five-year cycle.180 Intended NDCs are based 
upon a bottom-up, pluralised response that takes into consideration the 
structural, institutional, economic and social differences between states 
which affect their ability to contribute to global climate change reductions. 
These obligations allow individual countries to “self” determine how their 
contribution reflects “its highest possible ambition” and the principle of 
CBDRRC. 181  By allowing individual countries to determine their 
contributions, the Agreement recognises that developed and developing 
countries are starting at different points and thus allows self-differentiation 
between them and that differentiation will continue over successive cycles 
of NDCs. Nevertheless, the provisions of the Agreement are “designed to 
ensure that the regime as a whole moves toward ever more ambitious and 
rigorous actions.”182  
Therefore, at first reading, the integration of CBDRRC and 
differentiation between parties to the Paris Agreement appears to embody 
some ecofeminist ethics. This is because it recognises the differences 
between states in many different contexts and takes into account the 
specificities of mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity-
                                                     
178 FCCC, ‘FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC5’ (n 138) Submission of Japan, 40-41, 
Submission of the United States, 106; FCCC, ‘Ideas and Proposals on the Elements 
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building and transparency.183 For example, the differentiation in finance 
requires developed countries to provide financial resources to developing 
country parties and to take the lead in mobilising climate finance. 184 
Similarly, the Agreement creates a technology framework to “provide 
overarching guidance to the work of the convention’s technology 
mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology 
development and transfer.”185 It makes support available for collaborative 
approaches to research and development and facilitating access to 
technology.186 Finally, the introduction of INDCs and self-differentiation 
allows differences between states to be recognised. At the same time, the 
references to climate change as a “common concern” and the inclusion of 
transparency recognise that states are a member of a larger community 
which should cooperate to address shared dangers.187  
Nevertheless, the extent to which this iteration of differentiation is 
transformative in line with ecofeminist ethics is limited. This is because the 
primary marker of difference in the context of climate change is “economic 
reality.”188 CBDRRC was originally a concept that sought to recognise the 
acknowledgement of industrial contributions to the global environmental 
crisis.189 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration states that in the view “of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have 
common but differentiated responsibilities.” 190  Article 3(1) UNFCCC 
contains no such reference to the enhanced contributions of industrial 
countries to environmental degradation and placed both differentiated 
responsibility and respective capabilities on the same plane.191 This version 
of common but differentiated responsibilities indicates that the UNFCCC 
has weighted differentiation more towards economic capabilities and levels 
of economic development, rather than differing contributions to global 
degradation.  
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Thus, the interpretation of CBDR over the evolution of the climate 
change has reduced its focus to economic terms rather than a more 
pluralised account of the historic and moral responsibility of states. The 
focus on “future-oriented” approaches to CBDRRC within the recent 
negotiations and the Paris Agreement reflects a pragmatic, problem solving 
approach towards mitigation that is based on the ability of states to pay.192 
In this way, it emphasises the objective, disassociated and neutral logic that 
ecofeminists challenge for being ahistorical, and decontextualized.  
Furthermore, the “future-oriented” approach to CBDRRC within the 
Paris Agreement also highlights a fundamental assumption and tension 
within the CBDRRC principle that “[e]nhanced capabilities are a direct 
result of industrialisation, which in turn resulted in the spike in GHG 
emissions that is causing climate change.” 193  Some ecofeminists have 
warned that development through industrialisation is a colonisation through 
“capacity building” or technology transfer. 194  Therefore, basing 
differentiation upon the future potential of states may “become a pretext for 
significant interventions to assist with climate mitigation that themselves 
could be geared towards the expansion of neo-liberal market-based 
approaches and the regulation that enables them.” 195  This concern 
highlights that even though the CBDR principle has been incorporated 
within the Paris Agreement, the way in which it has been operationalised 
has the potential to continue the exploitation of developing countries 
through policies aimed at building their capacity to undertake their 
obligations. This approach towards differentiation is not transformational 
because it does not pay attention to context nor does it respect difference. 
Rather, it may in fact assimilate developing countries into a market as a 
type of economic colonisation which results in the stated intent of the law 
being undermined or rendered ineffective.  
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Analysing how “difference” is embedded in the UNCCD 
 
Unlike the UNFCCC, the UNCCD does not explicitly refer to the 
principle of CBDR. Instead, the Convention embeds differentiation into its 
overarching legal framework.196 It does this by attributing different state 
obligations to developed and developing countries in order to acknowledge 
their differences and relative asymmetries in levels of economic and 
technological development. At the same time, the UNCCD recognises that 
desertification and drought are problems of a global dimension that should 
be addressed at the national or local scale.197 However, as will be explored 
below, the success of this more diffuse approach towards differentiation 
has hindered its operationalisation.  
The implicit recognition of differences between developed and 
developing countries demonstrates how plurality is incorporated with the 
legal framework of the Convention. For example, the Convention 
differentiates between “general obligations” and more targeted obligations 
which outline additional obligations for developed country parties.198 It 
also recognises the geographical, cultural and social differences between 
different regions across the globe by incorporating four regional annexes. 
These may be considered an expression of differentiation because they 
include additional provisions that are relevant for the experiences of 
countries in different geographical locations that have particular economic, 
social, cultural and geographic conditions.  
The Regional Implementation Annex for Africa outlines the purpose of 
the annex to “provide for the efficient and practical implementation of the 
Convention to address conditions specific to Africa.”199 It outlines what 
these conditions are and makes reference to the “difficult socio-economic 
conditions, exacerbated by deteriorating and fluctuating terms of trade, 
external indebtedness and political instability, which induce internal, 
regional and international migrations.”200 The other annexes to the UNCCD 
also refer to the broader problems that their regions face as a way to 
contextualise the differentiation between states and the need for plural 
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responses to drought and desertification.201 For example, the Annex for 
Latin America and the Caribbean directly associate the use of 
 
“unsustainable practices … as a result of complex interactions 
among physical, biological, political, social, cultural and economic 
factors, including international economic factors such as external 
indebtedness, deteriorating terms of trade and trade practices which 
affect markets for agricultural, fishery and forestry products”202  
 
This sub-paragraph sets out that previous colonial and other 
exploitative practices by developed states has disproportionately affected 
the ability of Latin American and Caribbean countries to address drought 
and desertification. It also emphasises that factors such as deteriorating 
terms of trade, political and social factors all cause unsustainable 
development practices and are the result of these practices. Thus, this 
provision summarises the criticisms of development and the global market 
economy that maintain and reinforces difference to the detriment of some 
states.  
Similar provisions are also found in the Regional Annex for Asia. This 
Annex identifies the “the significant impact of conditions in the world 
economy and social problems such as poverty, poor health and nutrition, 
lack of food security, migration, displaced persons and demographic 
dynamics.”203 Once again, the Annex emphasises the external factors that 
cause and maintain differences between countries and affect the ability for 
states to respond to global environmental problems. Therefore, the 
inclusion of these annexes is transformative because it recognises 
difference is informed by the historical, social and political contexts of each 
country, which is in turn affected differently by the broader environmental 
problems of drought and desertification.  
However, the UNCCD has had relatively limited success in 
operationalising the differentiated obligations.204 One reason for this is that 
the language of differentiation is so diffuse within the text because it has 
been embedded within the entire legal framework of the Convention. This 
means that it is harder for affected developing country parties to extract the 
differential language within the Convention and turn it into activities and 
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targets to be implemented. Another reason is that the global North has 
traditionally seen the issue of desertification as more regional in scope and 
has less priority for them.205 In addition, the diffuse nature of differentiation 
means that it is difficult to measure progress and analyse how 
differentiating between different countries and/or regions has been 
successful (or not). Furthermore, inclusion of socioeconomic, cultural and 
other factors in the definition of desertification means that it is difficult to 
measure progress through scientific indicators, and other quantitative and 
qualitative measures.206 Coupled with the difficulties in determining the 
nature and extent of desertification, this is “among the causes of the difficult 
political life of the Convention.” 207  Nevertheless, the UNCCD offers 
transformative potential because it recognises that interactions between 
poverty, environment and natural resources can be understood at the local 
level, and as such should be resolved through activities at the local, 
national, regional and international levels.208 
The above discussion has compared the integration of differentiation 
into the UNFCCC and the UNCCD, and evaluated the effectiveness of its 
operationalisation in the UNCCD. It argued that CBDR/CBDRRC has the 
transformative potential to recognise and respect difference between 
countries both in terms of their contribution to environmental degradation 
and their corresponding ability to address this degradation. However, the 
analysis of the application of differentiation between countries in the 
climate change regime indicates that it has been reduced to focusing on the 
economic ability or future economic potential of countries rather than a 
respecting of difference and the broader historical, political and social 
context of the causes and consequences of those differences. In particular, 
the focus of “future-oriented” determination of difference in the Paris 
Agreement reduces differentiation to objective, disassociated and 
decontextualized measurements, a far cry from ecofeminist ethics.  
The treatment of differentiation in the UNCCD suggests that the 
negotiators attempted to develop a more transformative approach and one 
that is embedded in the broader historical context. The UNCCD also 
attempts to incorporate plurality at the local, national and international 
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levels, thus enabling differentiation to be tailored depending on the specific 
context of different communities and locations. This was reflected in the 
overarching structure of the Convention, and in the incorporation of the 
regional annexes which pay attention to the particularities of the different 
regions. For these reasons, the UNCCD has integrated a more plural 
approach towards differentiation and CBDRRC which has the potential to 
be transformative. Nevertheless, the operationalisation of CBDRRC and 
differentiation within the UNCCD has been more circumspect and suggests 
that some developed country parties to the convention are unwilling to 
embrace its potential.  
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
This article has compared the underlying values, assumptions and 
beliefs that inform the UNCCD and UNFCCC regimes through an 
ecofeminist analytical framework. This framework consists of three 
intersectional lenses which aggregate the eight boundary conditions to 
Karen Warren’s ecofeminist ethics. To recap, these lenses were termed 
“inclusivity”, “contextuality” and “structural pluralism”. These three lenses 
enabled a critique of the principles, obligations and rules within the two 
regimes.  
The comparison between UNFCCC and UNCCD through the 
“inclusivity” lens focused on the participation by different actors and the 
integration of ecosystem services. This comparison indicated that the 
participation by marginalised communities within the two regimes differed. 
In particular, the UNFCCC has been slow to support the participation by 
women in the climate change regime. It is only recently that the UNFCCC 
has incorporated gender recognition or gender mainstreaming into its 
policy-making process. This has been compounded by the relatively low 
participation by women in its negotiations. Compared to the UNFCCC, the 
UNCCD has been more “inclusive” since the start. As the UNCCD has been 
described as a “sustainable development convention”, this more inclusive 
approach is not surprising as the principle of participation is an integral 
aspect to sustainable development which underpins the Convention.  
However, the analysis also found that the UNFCCC has not engaged 
with the transformative potential of the participation by women. The 
analysis of the participatory provisions and the recently adopted Gender 
Action Program revealed that the UNFCCC has not engaged with the 
underlying reasons why women and other marginalised communities are 
disproportionately affected, what that says about human/non-human 
relationships understood within the regime and what this indicates about 
current strategies towards responding to these interconnected issues. By 
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doing so, the regime has approached the participation, climate change and 
women nexus in a superficial way that inhibits the transformative potential 
of the regime. 
By contrast, the UNCCD has adopted a Gender Programme of Action. 
This incorporates a more transformative approach towards gender. This is 
because it starts from a position that recognises the structural barriers faced 
by women, and acknowledges the fact that women are embedded within the 
material world. Because of this, the GPA concentrates on the local level 
and on developing actions that will address the barriers and exclusions 
faced by women there. As the GPA approaches inequalities from a social 
reproductive perspective, it has adopted a critical and nuanced 
understanding that takes into account the structural, conceptual and 
material barriers to participation faced by women. This indicates a greater 
engagement with the problems faced by women experiencing drought and 
desertification.  
However, both regimes continue to position humanity as the central 
consideration for state obligations. This incorporates anthropocentric and 
androcentric perspectives towards non-human nature within both regimes. 
The introduction of neo-liberal market mechanisms, such as payment for 
ecosystem services, and the commodification of nature maintains the 
perception of humanity as separate and disembedded from nature. This 
means that neither regime has incorporated particularly transformational 
approaches towards our position as humans within an ecological 
community. This finding was reaffirmed by the ways in which science and 
technology underpin the two regimes. The analysis through the 
“contextual” lens found that both regimes approach science and technology 
as potential solutions to environmental degradation. This technological 
optimism is regressive and could maintain the current exploitative approach 
towards environmental problem solving because it reduces non-human 
nature to something inert and dead, thus allowing its exploitation for the 
pursuit of industry and capitalism. 
The final lens focused on the approaches towards differentiation within 
the two regimes and how they integrated the principle of CBDR/CBDRRC. 
While the principle of CBDRRC has transformative potential to recognise 
and respect difference, the way in which it has been embedded within the 
climate change regime indicates that it has been reduced to focusing on the 
economic ability or future economic potential of countries rather than a 
respecting of differences and the broader historical, political and social 
context of the causes and consequences of those differences. On the other 
hand, the UNCCD has implicitly embedded differentiation within the 
structure and content of the Convention. This approach has transformative 
potential because of its pluralised and contextual understanding of 
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difference which is also based on history. Nevertheless, the 
operationalisation of CBDRRC and differentiation within the UNCCD has 
been more circumspect and suggests that some parties to the convention are 
unwilling to embrace its potential. 
Above all, this comparison highlights that there are some aspects of 
both regimes that have transformative potential. The UNCCD comes across 
at first reading as a regime that embodies more aspects of ecofeminist 
ethics, while at the same time, being still somewhat regressive. However, 
even though it may have the trappings of a truly transformative and 
successful regime, the fact that it addresses an environmental issue that has 
not, as yet, been recognised as a global issue (or one that affects not just 
developing countries), means that its potential is more circumscribed. This 
may be unintentional, or it may be implicitly recognising the potential of 
the regime, to which developed countries may be resistant. 
Nevertheless, the underlying narrative of both these regimes continues 
to affirm an ideological perspective that disembeds humans from their 
surrounding ecosystem while at the same time commodifying nature to 
protect it. The continued commitment to neoliberal market mechanisms that 
maintain the denial of the body and the material reality of our reliance upon 
and integration within non-human nature means that, irrespective of other 
transformative potentials within these two regimes, each remains wedded 
to the ideological commitments that contribute towards environmental 
degradation. They also remain wedded to paradigms that marginalise and 
exploit those communities and bodies which are traditionally associated 
with nature.  
